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Although both systems analyzed are described through two theories apparently different (quantum
mechanics and game theory) it is shown that both are analogous and thus exactly equivalents. The
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von Neumann equation. A population can be
represented by a quantum system in which each subpopulation playing strategy si is represented by
a pure ensemble in state |Ψk(t)〉 and with probability pk. The probability xi of playing strategy si
or the relative frequency of the individuals using strategy si in that population can be represented
as the probability ρ
ii
of finding each pure ensemble in the state |i〉.
Quantum mechanics could be used to explain more correctly biological and economical processes.
It could even encloses theories like games and evolutionary dynamics. We can take some concepts
and definitions from quantum mechanics and physics for the best understanding of the behavior of
economics and biology. Also, we could maybe understand nature like a game in where its players
compete for a common welfare and the equilibrium of the system that they are members. All the
members of our system will play a game in which its maximum payoff is the equilibrium of the
system. They act as a whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in where they prefer to work
for the welfare of the collective besides the individual welfare. A system where its members are
in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy state. A
system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the collective above the welfare of the individual.
If it is maximized the welfare of the individual above the welfare of the collective the system gets
unstable an eventually collapses. The results of this work shows that the “globalization” process has
a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is tending to a maximum entropy state and predicts
the apparition of big common markets and strong common currencies that will find its “equilibrium”
by decreasing its number until they get a state characterized by only one common currency and
only one common market around the world.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
With the purpose of beginning with our analysis we
will start from the fact that a physical system is mod-
eled through quantum mechanics and a socioeconomical
system through evolutionary game theory. The relation-
ships between these two systems are analyzed and it is
shown how although both systems are described through
two theories apparently different both are analogous and
thus exactly equivalents.
The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is
the von Neumann equation. The natural trend of these
systems is to a maximum entropy state which is their
state of equilibrium. A system in where all its mem-
bers are in Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a system
in a maximum entropy state. The “globalization” pro-
cess has a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that
is tending to a maximum entropy state and it is pre-
dicted the apparition of big common markets and strong
common currencies that will reach the “equilibrium” by
decreasing its number until they get a state characterized
by only one common currency and one common market
around the world.
We could understand nature like a game in where its
players compete for a common welfare and the equilib-
rium of the system that they are members. All the mem-
bers of our system will play a game in which its maxi-
mum payoff is the equilibrium of the system. They act
as a whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in
where they prefer to work for the welfare of the collec-
tive besides the individual welfare. The stability of the
system is given by the maximization of the welfare of the
collective. If it is maximized the welfare of the individ-
ual above the welfare of the collective the system gets
unstable an eventually collapses.
II. THE REPLICATOR DYNAMICS &
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Game theory [1–3] is the study of decision making of
competing agents in some conflict situation. It tries to
understand the birth and the development of conflict-
ing or cooperative behaviors among a group of individu-
als who behave rationally and strategically according to
their personal interests. Each member in the group strive
to maximize its welfare by choosing the best courses of
strategies from a cooperative or individual point of view.
2The central equilibrium concept in game theory is the
Nash Equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a set of
strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an
incentive to unilaterally change his action. Players are in
equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them
would lead that player to earn less than if he remained
with his current strategy. A Nash equilibrium satisfies
the following condition
E(p, p) ≥ E(r, p), (1)
whereE(si, sj) is a real number that represents the payoff
obtained by a player who plays the strategy si against
an opponent who plays the strategy sj . A player can not
increase his payoff if he decides to play the strategy r
instead of p.
Evolutionary game theory [4–6] does not rely on ratio-
nal assumptions but on the idea that the Darwinian pro-
cess of natural selection [7] drives organisms towards the
optimization of reproductive success [8]. Instead of work-
ing out the optimal strategy, the different phenotypes in
a population are associated with the basic strategies that
are shaped by trial and error by a process of natural selec-
tion or learning. The natural selection process that deter-
mines how populations playing specific strategies evolve
is known as the replicator dynamics [5, 6, 9, 10] whose
stable fixed points are Nash equilibria [2]. The central
equilibrium concept of evolutionary game theory is the
notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) introduced
by J. Smith and G. Price [4, 11]. An ESS is described
as a strategy which has the property that if all the mem-
bers of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy could
invade the population under the influence of natural se-
lection. ESS are interpreted as stable results of processes
of natural selection.
Consider a large population in which a two person
game G = (S,E) is played by randomly matched pairs of
animals generation after generation. Let p be the strat-
egy played by the vast majority of the population, and let
r be the strategy of a mutant present in small frequency.
Both p and r can be pure or mixed. An evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) p of a symmetric two-person game
G = (S,E) is a pure or mixed strategy for G which sat-
isfies the following two conditions
E(p, p) > E(r, p),
If E(p, p) = E(r, p) then E(p, r) > E(r, r). (2)
Since the stability condition only concerns to alternative
best replies, p is always evolutionarily stable if (p, p) is
a strict equilibrium point. An ESS is also a Nash equi-
librium since is the best reply to itself and the game is
symmetric. The set of all the strategies that are ESS
is a subset of the NE of the game. A population which
plays an ESS can withstand an invasion by a small group
of mutants playing a different strategy. It means that if
a few individuals which play a different strategy are in-
troduced into a population in an ESS, the evolutionarily
selection process would eventually eliminate the invaders.
The model used in EGT is the following: Each agent
in a n-player game where the ith player has as strategy
space Si is modeled by a population of players which have
to be partitioned into groups. Individuals in the same
group would all play the same strategy. Randomly we
make play the members of the subpopulations against
each other. The subpopulations that perform the best
will grow and those that do not will shrink and eventu-
ally will vanish. The process of natural selection assures
survival of the best players at the expense of the others.
The natural selection process that determines how popu-
lations playing specific strategies evolve is known as the
replicator dynamics
dxi
dt
= [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉]xi. (3)
The probability of playing certain strategy or the relative
frequency of individuals using that strategy is denoted
by frequency xi. The fitness function fi =
∑n
j=1 aijxj
specifies how successful each subpopulation is, 〈f(x)〉 =∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl is the average fitness of the population,
and aij are the elements of the payoff matrix A.
dxi
dt
=

 n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl

xi. (4)
The replicator dynamics rewards strategies that outper-
form the average by increasing their frequency, and pe-
nalizes poorly performing strategies by decreasing their
frequency. The stable fixed points of the replicator dy-
namics are Nash equilibria, it means that if a population
reaches a state which is a Nash equilibrium, it will remain
there.
Quantum games have proposed a new point of view
for the solution of the classical problems and dilemmas
in game theory. Quantum games are more efficient than
classical games and provide a saturated upper bound for
this efficiency [12–17].
III. THE VON NEUMANN EQUATION &
QUANTUM STATISTICAL MECHANICS
An ensemble is a collection of identically prepared
physical systems. When each member of the ensemble is
characterized by the same state vector |Ψ(t)〉 it is called
pure ensemble. If each member has a probability pi of be-
ing in the state |Ψi(t)〉 we have a mixed ensemble. Each
member of a mixed ensemble is a pure state and its evo-
lution is given by Schro¨dinger equation. To describe cor-
rectly a statistical mixture of states it is necessary the
3introduction of the density operator
ρ(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi |Ψi(t)〉 〈Ψi(t)| (5)
which contains all the physically significant information
we can obtain about the ensemble in question. Any two
ensembles that produce the same density operator are
physically indistinguishable. The diagonal elements ρnn
of the density operator ρ(t) represents the average prob-
ability of finding the system in the state |n〉 and its sum is
equal to 1. The non-diagonal elements ρnp expresses the
interference effects between the states |n〉 and |p〉 which
can appear when the state |Ψi〉 is a coherent linear su-
perposition of these states. The time evolution of the
density operator is given by the von Neumann equation
i~
dρ
dt
=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
(6)
which is only a generalization of the Schro¨dinger equation
and the quantum analogue of Liouville’s theorem.
IV. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
In table 1 we compare some characteristic aspects of
quantum mechanics and game theory [18–20].
Table 1
Quantum Mechanics Game Theory
n system members n players
Quantum States Strategies
Density Operator Relative Frequencies Vector
Von Neumann Equation Replicator Dynamics
Von Neumann Entropy Shannon Entropy
System Equilibrium Payoff
Maximum Entropy Maximum Payoff
It is easy to realize the clear resemblances and appar-
ent differences between both theories and between the
properties both enjoy. This was a motivation to try to
find an actual relationship between both systems.
It is important to note that the replicator dynamics
is a vectorial differential equation while von Neumann
equation can be represented in matrix form. If we would
like to compare both systems the first we would have
to do is to try to compare their evolution equations by
trying to find a matrix representation of the replicator
dynamics and this is [21]
dX
dt
= G+GT , (7)
where the relative frequencies matrix X has as elements
xij = (xixj)
1/2
and
(
G+GT
)
ij
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxkxij
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxkxji
−
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxlxij (8)
are the elements of the matrix
(
G+GT
)
. From this ma-
trix representation we can find a Lax representation of
the replicator dynamics [21]
dX
dt
= [[Q,X ] , X ] (9)
and with Λ = [Q,X ]
dX
dt
= [Λ, X ] . (10)
The matrix Λ is equal to
(Λ)ij =
1
2
[(
n∑
k=1
aikxk
)
xij − xji
(
n∑
k=1
ajkxk
)]
(11)
and Q is a diagonal matrix which has as elements
qii =
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk. (12)
It is easy to realize that the matrix commutative form of
the replicator dynamics (10) follows the same dynamic
than the von Neumann equation (6) and the properties
of their correspondent elements (matrixes) are similar,
being the properties corresponding to our quantum sys-
tem more general than the classical system.
Although a physical system is modeled and described
mathematically through quantum mechanics while a so-
cioeconomical is modeled through game theory both sys-
tems seem to have a similar behavior. Both are composed
by n members (particles, subsystems, players, states,
etc.). Each member of our systems is described by a state
or a strategy which has assigned a determined probabil-
ity. The quantum mechanical system is described by a
density operator ρ whose elements represent the system
average probability of being in a determined state. The
socioeconomical system is described through a relative
frequencies matrix X whose elements represent the fre-
quency of players playing a determined strategy. The
evolution equation of the relative frequencies matrix X
(which describes our socioeconomical system) is given by
a Lax form of the replicator dynamics which was shown
that follows the same dynamic than the evolution equa-
tion of the density operator (the von Neumann equation).
4Some specific resemblances between quantum statisti-
cal mechanics and evolutionary game theory are summa-
rized in the next table.
Table 2
Quantum Statistical Mechanics Evolutionary Game Theory
n system members n population members
Each member in the state |Ψk〉 Each member plays strategy si
|Ψk〉 with pk → ρij si → xi
ρ,
∑
i ρii= 1 X,
∑
i xi= 1
i~dρdt=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
dX
dt = [Λ, X ]
S = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} H = −
∑
i xi lnxi
In table 3 we compare the properties of the matrixes ρ
and X .
Table 3
Density Operator Relative Freq. Matrix
ρ is Hermitian X is Hermitian
Trρ(t) = 1 TrX = 1
ρ2(t) 6 ρ(t) X2= X
Trρ2(t) 6 1 TrX2(t) = 1
We can also propose the next “quantization relation-
ships”
xi →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |i 〉 = ρii,
(xixj)
1/2 →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |j 〉 = ρij . (13)
A population will be represented by a quantum system
in which each subpopulation playing strategy si will be
represented by a pure ensemble in the state |Ψk(t)〉 and
with probability pk. The probability xi of playing strat-
egy si or the relative frequency of the individuals using
strategy si in that population will be represented as the
probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the state
|i〉 [21]. Through these quantization relationships the
replicator dynamics (in matrix commutative form) takes
the form of the equation of evolution of mixed states i.e.
the von Neumann equation is the quantum analogue of
the replicator dynamics. And alsoX −→ ρ, Λ −→ − i
~
Hˆ,
(where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the physical system) and
H(x) −→ S(ρ) [22, 23].
V. THE COLLECTIVE WELFARE PRINCIPLE
& THE QUANTUM UNDERSTANDING OF
CLASSICAL SYSTEMS
If our systems are analogous and thus exactly equiv-
alents, our physical equilibrium (maximum entropy)
should be also exactly equivalent to our socioeconomi-
cal equilibrium (NE or ESS). And if the natural trend of
a physical system is to a maximum entropy state, should
not a socioeconomical system trend be also to a maxi-
mum entropy state which would have to be its state of
equilibrium? Has a socioeconomical system something
like a “natural trend”?
Based on the relationships previously analyzed and
specially in the analogous behavior between quantum
mechanics and game theory, it is suggested the following
(quantum) understanding of our system (classical and/or
socioeconomical): If in an isolated system each of its ac-
cessible states do not have the same probability, the sys-
tem is not in equilibrium. The system will vary and will
evolve in time until it reaches the equilibrium state in
where the probability of finding the system in each of
the accessible states is the same. The system will find
its more probable configuration in which the number of
accessible states is maximum and equally probable. The
whole system will vary and rearrange its state and the
states of its ensembles with the purpose of maximize its
entropy and reach its equilibrium state. We could say
that the purpose and maximum payoff of a physical sys-
tem is its maximum entropy state. The system and its
members will vary and rearrange themselves to reach the
best possible state for each of them which is also the best
possible state for the whole system.
This can be seen like a microscopical cooperation be-
tween quantum objects to improve their states with the
purpose of reaching or maintaining the equilibrium of the
system. All the members of our quantum system will play
a game in which its maximum payoff is the equilibrium of
the system. The members of the system act as a whole
besides individuals like they obey a rule in where they
prefer the welfare of the collective over the welfare of the
individual. This equilibrium is represented in the maxi-
mum system entropy in where the system resources are
fairly distributed over its members. This system is stable
only if it maximizes the welfare of the collective above the
welfare of the individual. If it is maximized the welfare of
the individual above the welfare of the collective the sys-
tem gets unstable and eventually it collapses (Collective
Welfare Principle) [18–23].
VI. THE EQUILIBRIUM PROCESS CALLED
GLOBALIZATION
Lets discuss how the world process that it is called
“globalization” has a behavior exactly equivalent to a
system that is tending to a maximum entropy state.
A. Globalization
Globalization represents the inexorable integration of
markets, nation-states, technologies [24] and the inten-
sification of consciousness of the world as a whole [25].
5This refers to increasing global connectivity, integration
and interdependence in the economic, social, technologi-
cal, cultural, political, and ecological spheres [26].
Globalization has various aspects which affect the
world in several different ways such as [26] the emergence
of worldwide production markets and broader access to
a range of goods for consumers and companies (indus-
trial), the emergence of worldwide financial markets and
better access to external financing for corporate, national
and subnational borrowers (financial), the realization of a
global common market, based on the freedom of exchange
of goods and capital (economical), the creation of a world
government which regulates the relationships among na-
tions and guarantees the rights arising from social and
economic globalization (political) [27], the increase in
information flows between geographically remote loca-
tions (informational), the growth of cross-cultural con-
tacts (cultural), the advent of global environmental chal-
lenges that can not be solved without international co-
operation, such as climate change, cross-boundary wa-
ter and air pollution, over-fishing of the ocean, and the
spread of invasive species (ecological) and the achieve-
ment of free circulation by people of all nations (social).
In economics, globalization is the convergence of prices,
products, wages, rates of interest and profits towards de-
veloped country norms [28]. Globalization of the econ-
omy depends on the role of human migration, interna-
tional trade, movement of capital, and integration of fi-
nancial markets. Economic globalization can be mea-
sured around the four main economic flows that charac-
terize globalization such as goods and services (e.g. ex-
ports plus imports as a proportion of national income or
per capita of population), labor/people (e.g. net migra-
tion rates; inward or outward migration flows, weighted
by population), capital (e.g. inward or outward direct in-
vestment as a proportion of national income or per head
of population), and technology. To what extent a nation-
state or culture is globalized in a particular year has until
most recently been measured employing simple proxies
like flows of trade, migration, or foreign direct invest-
ment, as described above. A multivariate approach to
measuring globalization is the recent index calculated by
the Swiss Think tank KOF [29]. The index measures the
three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social,
and political.
Maybe the firsts of these so called states-nations, com-
munities, “unions”, common markets, etc. were the
Unites States of America and the USSR (now the Russian
Federation). Both consists in a set or group of different
nations or states under the same basic laws or princi-
ples (constitution), policies, objectives and an economy
characterized by a same currency. Although each state or
nation is a part of a big community each of them can take
its own decisions and choose its own way of government,
policies, laws and punishments (e.g. death penalty) but
subject to a constitution (which is no more than a “com-
mon agreement”) and also subject to the decisions of the
“congress” of the community which regulates the whole
and the individual decisions of the parts. The United
States of America consists in 50 states and a federal dis-
trict. It also has many dependent territories located in
the Antilles and Oceania. The currency in The United
States is the Dollar. The Russian Federation consists in
a big number of political subdivisions (88 components).
There are 21 republics inside the federation with a big
degree of autonomy over most of the aspects. The rest
of territory consists in 48 provinces known as o´blast and
six regions (kray), between which there are 10 autonomic
districts and an autonomic o´blast and 2 federal cities
(Moscow and San Petersburg). Recently, seven federal
districts have been added. The currency in Russia is the
Rublo [26].
The European Union stands as an example that the
world should emulate by its sharing rights, responsibil-
ities, and values, including the obligation to help the
less fortunate. The most fundamental of these values
is democracy, understood to entail not merely periodic
elections, but also active and meaningful participation in
decision making, which requires an engaged civil society,
strong freedom of information norms, and a vibrant and
diversified media that are not controlled by the state or
a few oligarchs. The second value is social justice. An
economic and political system is to be judged by the ex-
tent to which individuals are able to flourish and real-
ize their potential. As individuals, they are part of an
ever-widening circle of communities, and they can real-
ize their potential only if they live in harmony with each
other. This, in turn, requires a sense of responsibility
and solidarity [30].
The meeting of 16 national leaders at the second East
Asia Summit (EAS) on the Philippine island of Cebu in
January 2007 offered the promise of the politically frac-
tious but economically powerful Asian mega-region one
day coalescing into a single meaningful unit [31].
Seth Kaplan has offered the innovative idea of a West
African Union to help solve West Africa’s deep-rooted
problems. The 15 West African countries stretching from
Senegal to Nigeria face some of the worst problems of the
developing world: Pervasive inter-group conflict; borders
that fail to reflect the cultural landscape; weak national
cohesion; corrupt officials and impotent institutions; a
dearth of skilled workers exacerbated by brain drain;
poor investment climates; and AIDS. Britain’s Depart-
ment for International Development considers ten of the
fifteen countries fragile. Seventy-five percent of the area’s
people live under governments that cannot deliver many
of the most basic services—including, in many cases, se-
curity. More than 25,000 peacekeepers are needed to
maintain a fragile peace in the region’s war zones. Con-
flicts spill easily across borders, as do refugees, arms, and
instability [32].
6In South America has been proposed the creation of
a Latin-American Community which is an offer for the
integration, the struggle against the poverty and the so-
cial exclusion of the countries of Latin-America. It is
based on the creation of mechanisms to create cooper-
ative advantages between countries that let balance the
asymmetries between the countries of the hemisphere and
the cooperation of funds to correct the inequalities of the
weak countries against the powerful nations. The econ-
omy ministers of Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador,
Venezuela and Bolivia agreed in the “Declaracio´n de
Asuncio´n” to create the Bank of the South and invite
the rest of countries to add to this project. The Brazilian
economy minister Mantega stand out that the new bank
is going to consolidate the economic, social and politic
block that is appearing in South America and now they
have to point to the creation of a common currency. Re-
cently, Uruguay has also accepted the offer of the creation
of the bank and the common currency and is expected
that more countries add to this offer [33].
B. The Equilibrium Process
After analyzing our systems we conclude that a so-
cioeconomical system has a behavior exactly equivalent
that a physical system. Both systems evolve in analo-
gous ways and to analogous points. A system where its
members are in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly
equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy state. The
stability of the system is based on the maximization of
the welfare of the collective above the welfare of the in-
dividual. The natural trend of a physical system is to
a maximum entropy state, should not a socioeconomical
system trend be also to a maximum entropy state which
would have to be its state of equilibrium? Has a socioe-
conomical system something like a “natural trend”?
From our analysis a population can be represented by
a quantum system in which each subpopulation playing
strategy si will be represented by a pure ensemble in the
state |Ψk(t)〉 and with probability pk. The probability
xi of playing strategy si or the relative frequency of the
individuals using strategy si in that population will be
represented as the probability ρii of finding each pure en-
semble in the state |i〉 [21]. Through these quantization
relationships the replicator dynamics (in matrix commu-
tative form) takes the form of the equation of evolution
of mixed states i.e. the von Neumann equation is the
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics. And also
X −→ ρ, Λ −→ − i
~
Hˆ , (where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of
the physical system) and H(x) −→ S(ρ) [22, 23].
Our now “quantum statistical” system composed by
quantum objects represented by quantum states which
represent the strategies with which “players” interact
would be characterized by certain interesting physical
parameters like temperature, entropy and energy. More-
over, we could define an entropy, an energy and a tem-
perature in every socioeconomical system but better and
actually our socioeconomical system would be character-
ized by an entropy, an energy, a temperature and would
have a similar or analogous behavior to a physical system.
From entropy we can analyze our system from two differ-
ent points of view through quantum information theory
and statistical mechanics [18–20, 23].
In this statistical mixture of ensembles (each ensemble
is characterized by a state and each state has assigned a
determined probability) its natural trend is to its max-
imum entropy state. If each of its accessible states do
not have the same probability, the system will vary and
will evolve in time until it reaches the equilibrium state in
where the probability of finding the system in each of the
accessible states is the same and its number is maximum.
In this equilibrium state or maximum entropy state the
system “resources” are fairly distributed over its mem-
bers. Each ensemble will be equally probable and will
be characterized by a same temperature and will be in a
stable state.
Socioeconomically and based on our analysis, our
world could be understood as a statistical mixture of “en-
sembles” (countries for example). Each of these ensem-
bles are characterized by a determined state and a deter-
mined probability. But more important, each “country”
is characterized by a specific “temperature” which is a
measure of the socioeconomical activity of that ensem-
ble. That temperature is related with the activity or with
the interactions between the members of the ensemble.
The system will evolve naturally to a maximum entropy
state. Each pure ensemble of this statistical mixture will
vary and accommodate its state until get the “thermal
equilibrium” first with its nearest neighbors creating new
big ensembles characterized each of them by a same tem-
perature. Then with the time, these new big ensembles
will seek its “thermal equilibrium” with its nearest neigh-
bors creating new bigger ensembles but less in number.
The system will continue evolving naturally in time until
the whole get a state characterized by a same “tempera-
ture”.
This behavior is very similar to what have been called
globalization and actually the process of equilibrium that
is absolutely equivalent to a system that is tending to a
maximum entropy state is the actual globalization. This
analysis predicts the apparition of big common “mar-
kets” or (economical, political, social, etc.) communi-
ties of countries (European Union, Asian Union, Latin-
American Community, African Union, Mideast Com-
munity, Russia and USA) and strong common curren-
cies (dollar, euro, yen, inti, etc.). The little and poor
economies eventually will finish unavoidably absorbed by
these “markets” and these currencies. If this process con-
tinues these markets or communities will find its “equilib-
7rium” by decreasing its number until there will be a mo-
ment in where there exists a big common community or
market and a same common currency around the world.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although both systems analyzed are described through
two theories apparently different (quantum mechanics
and game theory) both are analogous and thus exactly
equivalents. A socioeconomical system has a behavior
exactly equivalent that a physical system. Both systems
evolve in analogous ways and to analogous points. The
quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von
Neumann equation. A system where its members are
in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly equivalent to a
system in a maximum entropy state. The stability of the
system is based on the maximization of the welfare of
the collective above the welfare of the individual. The
natural trend of both systems is to its maximum entropy
state which is its state of equilibrium. The results of this
work show that the “globalization” process has a behav-
ior exactly equivalent to a system that is tending to a
maximum entropy state and predicts the apparition of
big common markets and strong common currencies that
will find its “equilibrium” by decreasing its number until
they get a state characterized by a big common commu-
nity or market and a same common currency around the
world.
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